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Abstract: We develop a two-sector model to analyze which kind of social
organization generates trust. Social capital is de￿ned as trust. We examine two
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to work and the virility community in which people do not commute to work.
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side work in the bedroom community. We show that in the bedroom community
social capital cannot accumulate. Hence our results show that time spent in-
teracting with your neighbor must be added as an important production factor
when considering the formation of social capital in society. Thus, in a commu-
nity where agents only interact when producing output, social capital may not
accumulate To our knowledge, no such attempt to model social capital has yet
been undertaken and this gap or ￿ missing link￿in economic debates has to be
developed to grasp a more holistic understanding of the big di⁄erences in the
wealth of nations or regions
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11 Introduction
Social capital is probably the scienti￿c concept that has gathered most attention
and most followers ever within a short period of time. It provides a common lan-
guage for all social sciences1 and has become a new buzzword (Paldam, 2000).
Overall the social capital approach can be regarded as an attempt to combine
sociology (social norm) and economics (production factor). Concerning a thor-
ough review of the interdisciplinary development and theoretical foundations of
social capital within economics, political science, sociology, development the-
ory and philosophy, see Ostrom and Ahn (2003). More recently much research
in economics has accumulated linking levels of high trust with higher level of
economic growth (Fukuyama (1995), Knack and Keefer (1997) and Zack and
Knack (2001)). If social capital really is a new production factor which must be
added to the conventional concepts of human and physical capital, the concept
will be of extreme interest to all social scientists.
Social capital was ￿rst de￿ned by the American sociologist James S. Coleman
(1988) as "the ability to cooperate in groups" and thereby achieve a common
goal. Such ability to cooperate assures an individual that he or she will not
be taken advantage of by another individual, even if the latter might get an
economic net bene￿t from doing it. Even if it pays economically to commit a
crime, free-ride or ignore the rules in a contract, fewer will do it in the pres-
ence of trust because social norms tell them not to do so. Thus, the community
members￿preferences can be a⁄ected and shaped, due to social norms and social
pressures (see Becker, 1996; Green and Shapiro, 1994; North 1990, for further
discussions on unstable preferences). The concept, however, is a broad concept
in strong need of both deductive modeling and inductive empirical surveys (Pal-
dam, 2000; Poulsen and Svendsen, 2004; Solow 2000). Despite the variety of
de￿nitions that prevail in the literature there is a widely accepted consensus
that, as any other form of capital, social capital yields a pro￿t by facilitating
the exchange of information and resources and by lowering transaction costs in
the economy. Individuals invest in social interactions in order to earn a payo⁄
that would otherwise not be earned. Such approach may eventually give a more
holistic understanding of the big di⁄erences in the wealth of nations or regions
(Svendsen and Svendsen, 2003).
Our contribution is to make a ￿rst attempt to model the informal institution
of social capital as a new production factor and to investigate which type of
community that generates social capital. We develop a two-sector model to
analyze which kind of social organization generates social capital in relation to
the case of commuting. Arguably, the main element in social capital2 is the level
1Overall the social capital approach can be regarded as an attempt to combine sociology
(social norm) and economics (production factor). Concerning a thorough review of the in-
terdisciplinary development and theoretical foundations of social capital within economics,
political science, sociology, development theory and philosophy, see Ostrom and Ahn (2003).
2Note, that we only use the social capital concept in a ￿ positive￿sense, namely when group
formation enhances overall economic growth. We ignore the socalled ￿ Hells Angels￿problem
or the ￿ dark side￿of social capital, e.g. ￿ negative￿economic e⁄ects following from criminal
gangs etc.
2of trust, which so far is the most applied measure (see Paldam, 2000). Fukuyama
(1995) de￿nes trust in the following way: "Trust arises when a community shares
a set of moral values in such a way as to create regular expectations of regular
and honest behavior.". Fukuyama (1995, 153).
Such trust-association connection ￿ts neatly into already existing game-
theoretical concepts such as reputation e⁄ects (Bjłrnskov, 2004). Such approach
is also noted by Putnam (1993b), who, in an article about democracy writes that
those who have social capital tend to accumulate more. These ￿ stocks of social
capital￿ , that is, the civic traditions of a society de￿ned as its, through history,
accumulated sum of trust, norms and networks, thus form the basis of further
accumulation of social capital (ibid.). More speci￿cally, one may argue that
what also Putnam (2000) has viewed as trust produced by regular face-to-face
contact between citizens may solve the fundamental problem in new institu-
tional economics, namely by compensating for the presence of asymmetrical
information and consequently reducing the level of transaction costs in society.
Following these authors we will argue that social capital is Trust Two com-
munity models are analyzed. In both communities social capital contributes
positively to the production of goods in society by facilitating the ￿ ow of infor-
mation between individuals. In economic terms this translates into assuming the
externalities enter the production of both goods. Furthermore we can restrict
these externalities to be positive. The ￿rst community is called, the bedroom
community. In this community people commute a long distance to work. Here,
we argue that because agents commute long distance they less leisure time. This
means that they have no time to engage in close social interactions with their
neighbors. The second community we look at is called the virility community.
There, people do not commute to work: hence they have time to engage in
spontaneous social interactions with their neighbors. Our results show that in
the Bedroom community social capital will not accumulate and is associated
with low levels of economic activities. In contrast, in the virility community,
social capital accumulates over time and is associated with higher levels of per
capita consumption. Our ￿ndings therefore indicate that the time you spend
interacting with your neighbors in the informal sector is a key determinant in
the accumulation of social capital. As in Zack and Knack (2001) higher levels
of social capital are associated with higher levels of economic growth. To our
knowledge, no such attempt to model social capital has yet been undertaken
and this ￿ missing link￿in economic debates will be dealt with in the following
sections.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the framework
common to both community models. In section 3, we describe the process of
accumulation of social capital in the centralized society. In section 4, we analyze
the case of the decentralized society. Section 5 gives a conclusion. All the proofs
are gathered in the Appendix in section 6.
32 The common framework of both models
The economy is populated by a continuum of identical consumers indexed by h,
where h 2 [0;1]. All consumers are in￿nitely lived and rational. Social capital
is embedded in each consumer h in an equal fraction . In other words we have
kh
0 = k where k is the aggregate social capital stock:
Fukuyama (1995) and Putman both see social capital as function of Trust
within a society, and a high degree of spontaneous social interactions between
members of the society. Society￿ s overall level of trust will be used in producing
output and will be denoted by k1. Trust will also be used in the informal sector
of the economy when two agents meet face to face spontaneously, and will be
denoted by k2. Each individual also has a ￿xed amount of time available, lt;that
for simplicity be normalized to unity. We assume that sector 1 is the output
sector. Production of output in this economy requires trust and that agents
spend some of their of time in the output sector. The number of units of leisure
time spend in commuting and therefore, allocated to the production level will be
labelled by l1
t: Sector 2 is the informal sector in which social capital is produced.
The number of units of time spend socializing in the informal sector will be
labelled by l2
t: Social capital also generate positive externalities that a⁄ect the
production of both sectors. To sum up we have
y = F1(k1;l1;X);
c = F2(k2;l2;X);
In both sectors we suppose that along a path with external e⁄ects, the
marginal productivities of both inputs are positive. The production of output
is assumed to exhibit diminishing marginal productivities in private inputs for
a given level of the aggregate capital stock X. We restrict the spillovers to be
labor augmenting3 In other words, we assume the following:
Assumption 1: Fi : <3
+ ! <+, is a continuous functions, i = 1;2. For a
given X 2 <+:
(i) Fi(:;:;:) is C2 on <++ ￿ <++ ￿ <+;
(ii) Fi(:;:;X) is homogenous of degree one and increasing over <++ ￿<++;
(iii) Fi









(v) External e⁄ects in sector 1 are Harrod-Neutral. Fi(k;l1;X) = Fi(k;l1X),
where F1(:;:) is homogenous of degree 1 in k and l1X:
The representative consumer maximizes his (discounted) intertemporal wel-
fare. At any point of time (which is discrete), welfare is measured by a utility
3This form of labor augmenting technological progress has been extensively used by the
learning by doing literature see Arrow (1962), Uzawa (1961), Sheshinski (1967), Harrod (1973),
Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988).
4function of current consumption per capita u(ct). We assume the following















where ￿ is the discount rate, 0 < ￿ < 1. Any consumer h 2 [0;1] is
initially endowed with an equal fraction of the aggregate capital stock kh
0 = k:
. The production side is composed of two continua of ￿rms indexed by i; where
i = 1;2. Within each sector ￿rms are identical. We assume that, the production
technology of both representative ￿rms also depends on the aggregate stock




Social Capital is assumed to depreciate in each time period. Denoting by ￿
the depreciation rate, this amounts to
Assumption 3 : 0 < ￿ < 1 for all t ￿ 0:
If yt denotes the current production of the informal sector, then the the stock
of social capital for next period, kt+1 is equal to
kt+1 = yt + (1 ￿ ￿)kt: (2)
We de￿ne the social production possibility frontier, T(k;y;X). It is the value
function of the maximization problem in which the representative ￿rm chooses
its output level given the existing stock of social capital, full employment of






k = k1 + k2;
1 = l1 + l2;
ki ￿ 0; li ￿ 0; i = 1;2:
For all given X ￿ 0
5Assumption 4 : T(k;y;X) is of class C2 on <++ ￿ <++ ￿ <+:
Using a standard argument it can be shown that for any given X ￿ 0;
T(k;y;X) is concave. The set of feasible interior solutions to (3) is is non-
empty and convex and de￿ned as
D(Xt) = f(kt;kt+1) 2 <+ ￿ <+ : (1 ￿ ￿)kt ￿ kt+1 ￿ F2(kt;Xt)g:
Drugeon and Venditti (1998) establish that the input demand functions
ki(kt;yt;Xt) and li(kt;yt;Xt); i = 1;2; are homogenous of degree 1 and 0, re-
spectively if external e⁄ects in both sectors are Harrod-Neutral. Hence T(kt;yt;Xt)
is homogenous of degree 1. For interior solutions to (5) for all given Xt ￿ 0 the
feasible set D(Xt) can then be restricted to
f(kt;kt+1) 2 <+ ￿ < : (1 ￿ ￿)kt ￿ kt+1 ￿ g(k;Xt) + (1 ￿ ￿)ktg:
Using the standard de￿nition of the indirect utility function given by V (kt;kt+1;Xt) ￿



















3 The Bedroom Community
3.1 The Model
We omit the time subscripts whenever they are not necessary. We assume that
production of output in sector 1 requires the use of trust. In this community
agents commute long distance. We assume for simplicity that the time they
spend commuting is part of the production of output in sector 1. We analyze
the case in which agents commute very long distance and have no time left to
interact in the informal sector. In other words we assume l1 = 1: We assume
6that the production technology used in sector 2 is linear4. Social capital also
generate positive externalities that a⁄ect the production of both sectors.
c = F1(k1;l1X);
y = Ak2X:
For this class of economies, the Production Possibility Frontier (P.P.F.) is












t ￿ 0; fXtg1
t=0 given:
Under Assumption 1, and given that ki
t 2 <￿
+; Problem (5) is a standard
concave maximization problem, for fXtg1
t=0 given. Assumption 1 ensures inte-
riority of solutions to (5). We can then de￿ne a function
h(k2;y;X) = F2(k2;X) ￿ y:
Under Assumption 1 we know that, for all given X ￿ 0; we have F2
1(k2;X) > 0:
So, applying the implicit function theorem for all given X ￿ 0 we ￿nd that
k2 = ’(y;X): (6)













For interior solutions to (5) for all given Xt ￿ 0 the feasible set D(Xt) can
then be restricted to
f(kt;kt+1) 2 <+ ￿ < : (1 ￿ ￿)kt ￿ kt+1 ￿ g(k;Xt) + (1 ￿ ￿)ktg:
Using the standard de￿nition of the indirect utility function given by V (kt;kt+1;Xt) ￿
[T(kt;kt+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)kt;Xt)]￿=￿; we can reformulate the representative agent￿ s
problem as
4This assumption guarantees that private returns are constant in the investment good
sector. The same result would be obtained had we assumed that the investment good sector


















An equilibrium path fktg, is an interior solution to Problem (9) if it solves a
￿xed point problem5 fktfXtgg = fXtg together with the necessary and su¢ cient
conditions given in the next Lemma:
Lemma 1 Let fktg1
t=0 be feasible path from k0. Then it solves the maximization
















tV (1;￿t;1) < 1: (12)
Proof. See Boldrin, Nishimura, Shigoka and Yano (2003), Drugeon, Poulsen
and Venditti (2003).
3.2 Existence, uniqueness and stability of the growth ray




In this framework since ￿ = A +1 ￿ ￿ and ￿ = 1 ￿ ￿: The Transversality
Condition (11) will be satis￿ed if the following assumption holds:
Assumption 5: ￿￿￿ < 1:
5We do not consider the question of existence to the ￿xed point problem for which the
sequence of externalities fXtg satis￿es fktfXtgg = fXtg for all t ￿ 0: A detailed treatment
of this issue is beyond the scope of this paper. We refer the reader to Romer (1983) and Mitra
(1998). They both address the existence issue of the ￿xed point problem fktfXtgg = fXtg
for all t ￿ 0 in a slightly di⁄erent framework.
8Lemma 2 A su¢ cient condition for the existence of an interior equilibrium
balanced growth path e ￿ > 1 is that
F2





Proof. See the Appendix.
Lemma 3 There exists a unique interior growth ray that satis￿es the conditions
of Lemma 1.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 4 The balanced growth path is locally unstable.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Corollary 5 If fctg1
t=0 > 0 for all t > 0; then the stock of social capital in the
decentralized economy will fall forever.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 4 and Corollary 5 imply that unless an economy starts initially in
the interior equilibrium, it will never converge to it. Suppose that the economy
is initially in the equilibrium and that ￿ > 1: In this case the stock of social
capital grows at a constant rate G =￿ ￿ 1 > 0: Suppose now that an exogenous
shock hits the economy, then the economy will converge either to the equilibrium
where G = ￿ ￿ 1 = ￿￿ or towards G = A ￿ ￿: In the ￿rst equilibrium, as time
goes by the stock of social capital will disappear. In the second equilibrium,
the stock of social capital would grow at a positive rate but all productive
resources would be allocated to the production of social capital at the expense
of consumption.
4 The Virility Community
4.1 The Model
As above we assume that sector 1 is the output sector. As above the production
of output requires the use of trust and that agents spend some time producing
output. But here, agents do not spend time commuting to work. Hence they
have some time left they can use interacting in the informal sector. Here, mem-
bers get to know each personally due to repeated social encounter and therefore
social capital is arguably produced using a fraction of the trust and some leisure
9time that the individuals use to interact spontaneously among themselves. So-





For this class of economies, the Production Possibility Frontier (P.P.F.) is












t ￿ 0; fXtg1
t=0 given:
Benhabib and Nishimura (1985) show that the sign of T21 is positive (negative) if
the investment good sector is more (less) capital intensive than the consumption
good sector. The consumption good sector is said to be more social capital
intensive if the net social capital stock, k1=l1; in the output sector is higher
than the net social capital stock in the investment good sectork2=l2: Drugeon,
Poulsen and Venditti (2003) and Poulsen (2003)establish:


















































Proof. See Drugeon and Venditti (1998) and Drugeon, Poulsen and Venditti
(2003), Poulsen (2001).
Corollary 7 Suppose the consumption good sector is capital intensive. Then,
T23 > 0.
105 Existence, Uniqueness and Indeterminacy
The growth factor of social capital can be de￿ned as kt+1=kt = ￿t: The maximum
feasible growth factor is ￿ and ￿ is the minimum feasible growth factor. Under
Harrod-Neutrality, ￿ = F2(1;1) and ￿ = 1 ￿ ￿. For the model to display
endogenous growth we need ￿ > 1: To ensure existence of an interior growth
ray with endogenous growth we also need F2(1;1) > ￿: In this case the model
does not have a steady state. A growth ray is de￿ned as follows:
De￿nition 8 An equilibrium path fktg is a growth ray if there exists a growth
factor ￿ 2 [0;￿] such that for all t ￿ 0; kt = ￿tk0; where k0 6= 0:
An equilibrium path is a solution to Problem 3 if it the following necessary
and su¢ cient conditions:
￿
1￿￿








tV (1;￿t;1) < 1. (20)
The transversality condition (19) is satis￿ed along a growth ray if the following
assumption holds:
Assumption 6: ￿[F2(1;1) + 1 ￿ ￿]￿ < 1:
Proposition 9 There exists an interior growth ray, e ￿ 2 (1;￿) if F2(1;1) > ￿
and
￿[F2
1(k2(1;e ￿;1);l2(1;e ￿;1)) > 1:
Proof. See Goenka and Poulsen (2004).
Following Boldrin and Rusticchini (1998) we give next a more precise de￿n-
ition of what is meant by indeterminacy.
De￿nition 10 A growth ray kt = ￿tk0 is locally indeterminate if for every
￿ > 0; there exists another equilibrium sequence fk0
tg with ￿ ￿
t = k ￿
t+1=k ￿
t such
that jk1 ￿ k0
1j < ￿ with k0 = k0
0:
For a system of dimension two, indeterminacy occurs when the two roots
of the characteristic polynomial are inside the unit circle. We see, from (18),
that in our model the dynamic system is of dimension 1. Therefore, if the
root associated with (18) is within (￿1;1); then the growth ray will be locally
indeterminate. In this model stability means indeterminacy .In what follows
we show that local indeterminacy arises no matter which sector is more social
capital intensive. Drugeon, Poulsen and Venditti (2003) show that the allocation
of productive resources between the two sectors a⁄ects the uniqueness property
of the growth ray. Furthermore, a necessary condition for the occurrence of
11multiple growth ray is that the investment good sector is capital intensive at
the private level at the growth ray. The multiplicity results are not a⁄ected by
the time structure of the model. We therefore refer the reader to this paper for
a more detailed exposition.









(ii) A necessary and su¢ cient condition for the growth ray to be locally inde-












Proof. See Goenka and Poulsen (2004):
Proposition 11 and the uniqueness result of Drugeon, Poulsen and Venditti
(2003) imply that when the consumption good sector is more social capital
intensive, then the stock of social capital will grow at a constant rate G: It may
stay there forever if V21(1;￿;1) < 0 i.e. if social capital does not depreciate too
slowly and if the marginal utility of consumption is relatively inelastic6. In this
case they would also exists an in￿nity of social capital sequences all growing
asymptotically at the same rate.
If the investment good sector is more social capital intensive then the Dru-
geon, Poulsen and Venditti (2003) have established the following result
Proposition 12 (i) A su¢ cient condition for the occurrence of at least three


















(ii) A necessary condition for the occurrence of at least three growth rays is that
the investment good sector is more capital intensive.
Proof. See Drugeon, Poulsen and Venditti (2003).
This would imply that there exists at least one equilibrium with a low growth
rate, one equilibrium with a medium growth rate and one equilibrium with a
6Goenka and Poulsen (2004) shows that V21 < 0 if T [T12 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)T22] + (￿ ￿
1)T2 [T1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)T2] < 0: Under the results of Lemma this requires both that




T [T12 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)T22]
T2 [T1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)T2]
> 1 ￿ ￿:
12high growth rate for social capital. If the medium equilibrium is stable then it
follows that the low one and the high one are unstable. The economy ￿ s stock of
social capital would be growing at a positive growth rate. We can now establish
the following result.
Corollary 13 Suppose there exists three equilibria. Then a necessary condition







Proof. See the Appendix.
6 Conclusion
Social capital is becoming a buzzword in the policy debates around the world,
but this should not discourage the development of a more precise and detailed
understanding of it; hence this paper. How to model the level of social capital
within a country is not a trivial question and a gap in the literature exists.
If social capital really matters, it is important to understand how it works.
Here, theory suggested that social capital may be one of the ￿ missing links￿
in explaining and creating a coherent theory of the role of trust in society,
here exempli￿ed as the case of commuting. Eventually such insight may help
explaining the big di⁄erences in the wealth of nations or regions.
We developed a two-sector social capital model to answer whether social
capital is a new production factor and what social organization that may foster
it. By focusing on the case of commuting and de￿ning social capital as Trust, we
demonstrated that the presence of time spent in spontaneous social interactions
in the virility community (and the option of spending leisure time for civic
activities rather than driving the long and winding road) must be added as an
important production factor when considering the formation of social capital in
society. In contrast, the bedroom community cannot accumulate social capital
when all time is devoted to producing output. Thus, in a community where
social capital may not accumulate.
This comparison between two di⁄erent community models indicates that as
one moves from a non-commuting to a commuting society, some social capital is
lost. Basically, not driving the long and winding road in your car leaves you free
to interact with other people in the tennis club, for example. In modelling terms
this amounted to assuming that leisure time is no longer used as an input in
the production of social capital. The model showed that in communities where
no agents have not time interacting in the informal sector, then the economy
moves to an unstable equilibrium.
Tracing the very origins of social capital in society, however, requires more
research. Some future research could be to analyze the determinants of trust.
Fukuyama (1995) sees social capital as function of two factors: a high degree
of generalized trust within a society, and a high degree of spontaneous social
13interactions between members of the society. Putnam (1993a) has argued that
Particularized Trust arising from interactions in voluntary organizations spill
over into General Trust. Future research should therefore do more rigorous
empirical research and try to establish the exact relationship between partic-
ularized and generalized trust. Such investigations may demonstrate why the
level of social capital di⁄er across countries and how policy makers can stimu-
late the accumulation of ￿ positive￿social capital in a society. These, and many
other questions, will help establishing the exact importance of social capital,
not only in everyday life, but also for the role of the State and public policy,
e.g. in relation to long-distance commuting.
7 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2
Under Assumption 1, F2(k2;X) is homogenous of degree one in its argu-
ments. The Euler theorem on homogenous functions tells us that y = F2
1(k2;X)k2+
F2
2(k2;X)X: We can also apply this theorem to deduct that F2
1(k2;X) and
F2
1(k2;X) are homogenous of degree 0: Since, ’(y;X) is homogenous of degree




We know under Assumption 1 that F2
2(’(￿t ￿1+￿;1);1) > 0: It must then
be true for all ￿t 2 (1;￿) that
￿t ￿ 1 + ￿ > F2
1(’(￿t ￿ 1 + ￿;1);1)’(￿t ￿ 1 + ￿;1): (23)
At ￿t = ￿ , ￿ = F2(1;1)+1￿￿: This implies that at ￿t = ￿ we have ’(
￿
￿ ￿1+
￿;1) = 1: Hence, at ￿t = ￿ we can rewrite (23) as
￿ > F2
1(1;1) + 1 ￿ ￿: (24)












1(’(￿ ￿ 1 + ￿;1);1) + 1 ￿ ￿
we can rewrite (25) as "(￿) = ￿(￿): It follows that (24) is equivalent to
lim
￿!￿
￿(￿) < ￿: (27)




This is equivalent to writing that
lim
￿!￿
"(￿) > ￿: (28)










1(’(￿;1);1) + 1 ￿ ￿:
Proof of Lemma 3
The question of uniqueness of the balanced growth path can be addressed










￿(￿): The su¢ cient condition for
existence guarantees that "(1) < ￿(1): So, the uniqueness of the balanced growth
path depends on whether ￿(￿) is strictly decreasing or not. If we di⁄erentiate
￿(￿) = F2
1(’(￿ ￿ 1 + ￿);1) + 1 ￿ ￿ with respect to ￿; we obtain
￿ ￿(￿) = F2
11(’(￿ ￿ 1 + ￿);1)’1(￿ ￿ 1 + ￿): (29)
We know that












where the last inequality is obtained from Assumption 1. The uniqueness result
follows.
Proof of Lemma 4
Let us ￿rst show that for all ￿t 2 (1;￿) the sign of V21 is strictly positive.
Let us recall that we have de￿ned
V (kt;kt+1;Xt) =
￿










































Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the sign of (32) is strictly positive. Using the
de￿nition of V (kt;kt+1;Xt) given in (30), we can also compute V1(kt;kt+1;Xt)
as
V1 = (F1)￿￿1F1








If we look at the expression of V2(kt;kt+1;Xt) obtained in (31) and compare it




1(’(kt+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)kt;Xt);X) + 1 ￿ ￿
:






1(’(￿t ￿ 1 + ￿;1);1) + 1 ￿ ￿]
= v(￿t+1):
We have seen above that, for all ￿t 2 (1;￿) we have V21(1;￿t;1) > 0: This
implies that for all ￿t 2 (1;￿); v ￿(￿t) > 0: v(￿t) is invertible. For all ￿t 2 (1;
￿
￿)






1(’(￿t ￿ 1 + ￿;1);1) + 1 ￿ ￿]
= v(￿(￿t)): (34)







1(’(￿t ￿ 1 + ￿;1);1) + 1 ￿ ￿]
￿
: (35)
16We can rewrite the Euler Equation as  (￿t;￿(￿t)) = 0: Applying the implicit










Under Assumption 1 and 2, we know that V (kt;kt+1;kt) is homogenous of degree
0 < ￿ ￿ 1: This implies that V2(kt;kt+1;Xt) is homogenous of degree ￿￿1: So,
applying the Euler theorem on homogenous functions, we get
(￿ ￿ 1)V2(1;￿t;1) = V12(1;￿t;1) + V22(1;￿t;1)￿t + V23(1;￿t;1):



















(￿t) + (1 ￿ ￿)v(￿t)
￿(F2









We know from (32) that V21(1;￿t;1) > 0 for all ￿t 2 (1;
￿
￿): Under Assumptions
1 and 2 we see that ￿
0
(￿t) is strictly positive for all ￿t 2 (1;
￿
￿): We know that a
su¢ cient condition for the existence of a balanced growth path is that at ￿t = 1
we have
F2










1(1;’(￿;1)) + 1 ￿ ￿
￿
> 1:
So under condition (37), we have v(1) > v(￿(1)): We have shown in Propo-
sition ?? that v ￿(￿t) > 0: So, at ￿t = 1 we have
1 > ￿(1): (38)





























We know that ￿ is a unique equilibrium that solves the representative agent￿ s
problem. We know that ￿
￿(￿t) > 0 for all ￿t 2 (1;
￿
￿): So, (38) and (40) imply
that ￿(￿t) cuts the 45 degree line from below at e ￿: It then follows that
￿
￿(e ￿) > 1:
The balanced growth path is globally determinate.
Proof of Corollary 13.























￿(e ￿) = F2




then we see that (41) is equivalent to
￿ ￿(e ￿) > ￿ ￿(e ￿):







For endogenous growth we need e ￿ > 1:
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